In my last post I used the example of the superstition of walking under a ladder, and argued that it is every bit as long-standing, and evolutionary, and widely held, and dear to people, as are the moral views that Harris defends, but that while he would ridicule the former, he provides little serious account of the latter. Amazingly, he uses a very similar example in attacking Francis Collins’ argument for the existence of God.
Collins argues that the mere existence of genuine altruism, for which Collins claims there can be no evolutionary explanation, proves that God exists. Harris rightly rejects this, because, after all, there are many other irrational actions humans engage in, and this hardly proves God’s existence:
Smoking cigarettes isn’t a healthy habit and is unlikely to offer an adaptive advantage…but this habit is very widespread and compelling. Is God, by any chance, a tobacco farmer…? It is hard to interpret this oversight in light of his scientific training. If one didn’t know better, one might be tempted to conclude that religious dogmatism presents an obstacle to scientific reasoning. (ML p. 170).
Yet self-sacrifice, and the hosannahs that have been lavished upon it in history—not to mention the emotional “glow” people claim to feel from it, which is actually a result of long and intense propaganda, and which is belied by the frequency with which people must be coerced into exercising it—might also as easily be unhealthy habits, no? Equally unlikely to offer adaptive advantages? Is this not at least possible? Harris never pauses to consider the possibility. On the contrary, like Collins, he simply assumes that such a prima facie irrational behavior is true morality—indeed, “heroic”! (p. 92) Why? Because people feel good about it...just like nicotene addicts do! (59, 92)
Note also how Harris uses the term “health,” a concept he elsewhere rightly analogizes to moral success (or “well-being”). Morality, in the Aristotelian tradition to which I subscribe, is indeed seen as the art of promoting, as well as the experience of, the health of the psyche. (And thus morality is fundamentally self-oriented.) Yet Harris defines it instead—literally defines it—as the rules of social interaction and cooperation (55). Is God, by any chance, a device by which to defend an indefensible moral position—i.e., “true” altruism—which in reality is unhealthy for the psyche and wrong for human beings? It is hard to interpret Harris’ refusal to consider this possibility in light of his asserted skepticism. If one didn’t know better, one might be tempted to conclude that politics, or dogmatic adherence to sacred-cow moral propositions presents an obstacle to his philosophical reasoning.
