I am pleased to see that Paul overtly rejects the philosophy of Thomas Jefferson. This illustrates the distance between conservatism and the views of the founders of this nation—a theme on which Harry Jaffa has written some brilliant words. And it supports my assertion that many people who call themselves conservatives are not, really; they mistakenly believe that that term describes those who believe in the views of the founders of the United States.
Paul is at least honest enough to reject Jefferson, although his familiarity with Jefferson leaves much to be desired. “[T]he Jeffersonian system is one that seeks to break the individual away from the fetters of tradition,” he says. “His is ultimately a Rousseauistic credo which, as Roget [sic] Nisbet writes, ‘is the confluence of a radical individualism on the one hand and an uncompromising authoritarianism on the other.’ As a result of this radical individualism the individual asserts his independence not from the state, but from society. ‘The traditional bonds of society, the relationships we generally speak of as social, are the ties that to Rousseau symbolize the chains of existence.’”
Ah, the same old conservative puffery. “Chains of existence” indeed. But it is wrong to describe Jefferson as a devotee of Rousseau. I know of no evidence to suggest that Jefferson was an admirer of Rousseau, and Madison, Jefferson’s greatest protégé, went to great pains to distance himself from Rousseau. Jefferson’s view is Lockean, not Rousseauian. For Locke, as for Jefferson, the relevant consideration when evaluating man as a political animal is man’s capacity to reason; reason, for Locke as for Jefferson, was the very definition of the law of nature. Not so for Rousseau, for whom “[man] must be divested of all qualities that are connected with life in a community if we are to understand him as he is by nature. The first and most important of these is reason…. Hence, [for Rousseau], the definition of man can no longer be that he is a rational animal.” Allan Bloom, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, eds., History of Political Philosophy 563 (3d ed. 1987). Jefferson had no concept analogous to Rousseau’s “General Will,” and believed property one of the essential rights of man—contrary to Rousseau, who thought it the beginning of all inequality and social evil. To say that Jefferson and Rousseau were alike can only be accurate in the sense that both were male, and both were fluent in French. The similarities diminish after this point.
It is also very far from being true that Jefferson’s political thought involved asserting “independence…from society.” This is absurd. A far better way of understanding the difference between Nisbet’s conservatism and Jefferson’s liberalism is to consult Jefferson’s own description of the two:
The fact is, that at the formation of our government, many had formed their political opinions on European writings and practices, believing [these]…a safer guide than mere theory. The doctrines of Europe were, that men in numerous associations cannot be restrained within the limits of order and justice, but by forces physical and moral, wielded over them by authorities independent of their will. Hence their organization of kings, hereditary nobles, and priests…. We believed…that man was a rational animal, endowed by nature with rights, and with an innate sense of justice; and that he could be restrained from wrong and protected in right, by moderate powers, confided to persons of his own choice, and held to their duties by dependence on his own will. We believed that the complicated organization of kings, nobles, and priests, was not the wisest nor best to effect the happiness of associated man…. We believed that men, enjoying in ease and security the full fruits of their own industry, enlisted by all their interests on the side of law and order, habituated to think for themselves, and to follow their reason as their guide, would be ore easily and safely governed than with minds nourished in error, and vitiated and debased, as in Europe, by ignorance, indigence, and oppression.
Letter to William Johnson, June 12, 1823, in 3 James Morton Smith, ed., The Republic of Letters 1862-63 (1995). Jefferson’s view was not that man should be “independent” from society, but that what passed for “society” in the minds of European political philosophers (and later, of Robert Nisbet) was in fact the abusive state of man, whereby individuals were ordered about, told how to live their lives, and kept in poverty, ignorance and superstition, for the benefit of the noble classes. He was, of course, absolutely right about that. Paul’s and Nisbet’s characterization of Jefferson shows, at best, woeful ignorance of the views of Rousseau and Jefferson, and at worst, a willful attempt to mischaracterize them.
Maybe it is woeful ignorance. For instance, Paul claims that Jeffersonian philosophy views each “human being [as] sovereign lord and capable of determining his or her own morality.” But Jefferson, like Locke, never believed that morality was a matter of individual choice; human being is sovereign lord and capable of determining his or her own morality the law of nature, for them, is reason, and if a person violates that law, he is liable to be treated as an animal. The people, Jefferson said, “are inherently independent of all but moral law.” (emphasis added). Indeed, after studying the work of Thomas Jefferson for over a decade, I know of not a single example of Jefferson saying anything even approaching moral subjectivism, and of course Paul provides no examples.
Paul then asserts that Jeffersonian individualism “deni[es] the importance of tradition [thereby] creat[ing] a community bereft of order.” Tom Palmer has refuted this sufficiently in this essay which I already linked to. But when you connect the fact that, again, neither Paul nor Nisbet provide us with any examples of Jefferson “denying the importance of tradition” or endorsing moral subjectivism, well, it makes you begin to doubt that Paul is merely ignorant. In fact, what is going on is the usual sort of slander against liberty, which Jefferson slyly refuted in his Second Inaugural Address. There, Jefferson spoke of men like Nisbet when pretending to speak of the Indians:
These persons inculcate a sanctimonious reverence for the customs of their ancestors; that whatsoever they did must be done through all time; that reason is a false guide, and to advance under its counsel in their physical, moral, or political condition is perilous innovation; that their duty is to remain as their Creator made them, ignorance being safety and knowledge full of danger; in short, my friends, among them also is seen the action and counteraction of good sense and of bigotry; they too have their antiphilosophers who find an interest in keeping things in their present state, who dread reformation, and exert all their faculties to maintain the ascendancy of habit over the duty of improving our reason and obeying its mandates.
So much for Paul’s understanding of Jefferson’s political philosophy. He next tries to convince us that the horrifyingly radical individualism which he ascribes to libertarianism—but which, in reality, is no part of libertarianism—leads to collectivism:
Take the…quote by Jefferson about the earth belonging to the living, that the dead have no rights. Each generation starts anew. But such a theory breaks down all orders. Each opinion as valued as the next, each mob ready to overrule the previous one, and the disorganization of such chaos erupts into a frenzied state which must, of consequence, be tamed. Humans are free thus to engage in wild pursuits, but such freedom is fleeting.
Of course, Jefferson’s statement that the earth belongs to the living does not proceed from moral subjectivism, and does not suggest that “[e]ach opinion is as valued as the next.” In fact, as Jefferson makes clear in his letter (which Paul does not appear to have read), he bases his argument that the earth belongs to the living on the premise that “by the law of nature, one generation is to another as one independent nation to another.” By the law of nature—that is, by an unchanging, eternal rule which does not depend on opinion. Paul’s and Nisbet’s attempt to ascribe moral subjectivism to Jefferson fails, yet again. The final invocations of “chaos” and “disorganization” and “frenzy” are, yet again, conservative bogeymen designed to frighten us into believing that we must either choose to live our lives at the behest of our neighbors, or degenerate into bloodshed and anarchy. Responding to the same allegation four centuries ago, the great Christian libertarian Algernon Sidney (a devotee of Rousseau also, no doubt) said that
our author confines the subject’s choice to acting or suffering, that is, doing what is commanded, or lying down to have his throat cut, or to see his family and country made desolate. This he calls giving to Caesar that which is Caesar’s; whereas he ought to have considered that the question is not whether that which is Caesar’s should be rendered to him, for that is to be done to all men; but who is Caesar, and what doth of right belong to him, which he no way indicates to us: so that the question remains entire….
(Please also read the Sidney quote in this post.)
Having demonstrated his complete ignorance of Thomas Jefferson’s views—except for his accurate statement that conservatism rejects those views—and having slandered Jefferson as a devotee of Rousseau, he makes a fascinating conclusion: “[T]he state, according to Babbit, should have a higher self, ‘appropriately embodied in institutions, that should set bounds to its ordinary self as expressed by the popular will at any particular moment….’” Why, how interesting. After criticizing Jefferson (baselessly) for being “Rousseauistic,” Paul endorses the concept of the General Will!
But this is not terribly surprising, because for Paul, and, as I have said, for conservatism generally, the primary goal is to get you to live your life for the sake of Society. In my previous post I said that Paul’s argument is simply an attempt to turn you into Boxer from Animal Farm. If you thought I was exaggerating (as Paul claimed), we now have his words to prove it: “There is a greater good, and we must serve it, but we must do it of our own accord.”
What if we don’t want to? Well, Paul claims that conservatism is just a recommendation, you know—conservatives aren’t going to force you to do anything you don’t want to do. No…of course not. “[W]hile conservatives believe that man must have higher values, the government cannot coerce him,” writes Paul. But why not? Paul, yet again, does not tell us—he provides us with no explanation for limiting the role of the state. (But then he quotes Russell Kirk, who, shortly before his death, called for the creation of an established church in the United States. Hmmm….) Now, conservatives favor things like the Drug War and the prohibition on gay marriage; Robert Bork argues in favor of government censorship, in Slouching, and conservatives believe in government supporting religion. Paul doth protest too much, methinks. Conservatives are most certainly in favor of government coercing people to “have higher values.” “We are free to order our lives as we choose fit [sic],” says Paul. But not if they choose to order their lives in the form of, say, gay marriage, or drug use, or other things that Paul finds “disruptive.” Indeed, when a one person left a comment on Paul’s site asking “what about the FCC?” Paul answered, “there must be some clearcut standards for broadcast [sic]. But such is not an example of coercion.” Oh! No! Of course not!
One final note. I’ve already linked to Tom Palmer’s excellent refutation of the classic conservative lie that libertarians don’t believe that people should cherish tradition, or that people should honor their connections to one another. It’s sad, on one hand, that conservatives have to resort to such slander rather than to serious arguments against libertarianism. But it is also extremely offensive. The notion that libertarians do not believe that “individuals ought to take special heed [sic]… to [sic] established customs” is infuriating. Paul—a man who has demonstrated that he knows practically nothing about Thomas Jefferson, whose work is certainly an “established custom” in America—dares to suggest that I pay no heed to established customs? Any reader of this site, who has been bored by my longwinded discussions of history and custom, knows how false this is. And Paul claims that libertarians have no “appreciation for transcedence [sic]”? How the hell dare he say this of the philosophy of John Milton, Algernon Sidney, John Locke, Thomas Jefferson, Frederic Bastiat, Lord Acton...? Well, again, as Nietzsche said,
Sometimes it is also said [by conservatives] that certain free principles derive from perverseness and eccentricity; but this is only the voice of malice, which does not, itself, belief what it says, but only wants to hurt: for the free spirit generally has proof of his greater kindness and sharp intellect written so legibly on his face that bound spirits understand it well enough.
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