Every time someone wants to represent Abraham Lincoln as soft on slavery, which he wasn’t, they like to point to his famous August 22, 1862, letter to Horace Greeley, in which he said
I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored the nearer the Union will be “the Union as it was.” If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save Slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy Slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or destroy Slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about Slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save this Union, and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union.
This is usually pointed to as evidence that Lincoln didn’t really care about slaves, just about keeping the union together—the unspoken conclusion being that there was something wrong with that set of priorities. In fact, what’s important about this letter is not Lincoln’s emphasis on preserving the union. That was old news by 1862. Lincoln had made clear time and again that that was his policy. Andrew Jackson had used force to preserve the union only thirty years before, and everybody remembered it. Decades before, Washington had called out troops to put down the Whiskey Rebellion, and the Adams administration had considered using force for similar reasons.
What was important about this letter was the phrase, “if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it.” This was the first time that a president had spoken in such language. John Quincy Adams, as a Congressman, had said that a president had power, hypothetically, to free the slaves in wartime, but no sitting president had ever before said that he would be willing to free all the slaves if necessary to fulfill his legal obligation to see that the law be faithfully executed. And to emphasize that fact, Lincoln concluded by reiterating his “oft-expressed personal wish that all men, everywhere, could be free.”
To read this letter as if it were a retreat from a strong position is to read it completely backwards, and to ignore the historical context in which it was written. Lincoln had no explicit constitutional authority to free slaves, and his scruples as well as his tenuous support from the border states forced him to toe the constitutional line. That meant prioritizing the union over slavery whatever his personal feelings. Of course, the anti-slavery cause had much more to gain from preserving the union than seeing it go; the south had seceded, after all, precisely because they knew that slavery could no longer expect protection from the democratically constituted government. But Adams had argued that the president could free slaves as a wartime measure to seize enemy contraband or eliminate the cause of the war—which, of course, is what Lincoln did just half a year later. By appearing to moderate Greeley’s demand for emancipation, Lincoln was in fact announcing for the first time that the president reserved the option of doing just that. He could have promised not to free the slaves to entice the south to return; he did the opposite.
The proper way to read this letter is as a threat that if the south would not submit—and return to a constitutional process whereby slavery could be ended peacefully through democratic and constitutional means—that Lincoln would not flinch at exercising his wartime power to abolish slavery. And that was news.
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