For fifty years, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) stood as the linchpin of the Western effort to contain the Soviet Union. The defense of Western Europe and almost all major European security operations were undertaken through the framework of the Brussels based institution. Transatlantic security policy and military force structure were coordinated under the auspices of the NATO pact. Although the organization endured contentious disputes between member-states dissatisfied with the direction its policy took (France under de Gaulle had an especially fiery relationship with NATO), the fundamental Soviet threat maintained the body as a cohesive platform for organizing the Western power bloc. Since the demise of USSR more than ten years ago, however, many have questioned whether NATO still serves a useful purpose as a central international institution. Powerful skeptics of NATO and the growing capabilities gap between the United States and Europe have eroded the use of NATO as a central forum for facilitating the use of force. Where NATO has been employed, the results have been unimpressive. Proponents of NATO, led by Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, have endorsed broad reform of the institution, aimed at transforming it to combat the threats of the modern age.
The Cost-Benefit Calculus
Clearly, an institution as complex as NATO cannot be evaluated in terms of black and white; instead, a careful comparison of its advantages and detriments is in order. It’s evident that the cost-benefit calculus will change depending upon what perspective one considers the issue from. Obviously, a nation such as France that seeks to use international institutions to bolster its own power will hold a different view of the organization than a country such as the United States. In this case, the benefits and detriments of NATO will be evaluated from Washington’s perspective.
One of the central purposes of the alliance is to organize joint-military operations in defense of Western interests. Ranging from the defense of Germany to the war on radical Islamic terrorism, NATO is designed to focus the military power of its member-states against the common enemies of the Western world. To this end, NATO has been employed in such operations as the bombing of Yugoslavia and the reconstruction of Afghanistan. However, two considerable structural impediments to joint-operations currently exist, and they are being exacerbated by current European military and fiscal policies. These are the capabilities gap between American and European forces, and the inability of many European nations to adequately finance a large-scale commitment of forces.
The capabilities gap between US and European forces is particularly hard to overcome. Essentially, significantly larger United States military expenditures (particularly in the area of force integration and research and development) have created an imbalance in the forces of the two groups, making coordination and joint-operations difficult. More sophisticated US communications and battlefield management systems (C4IR assets) are not interoperable with European systems, making synergy between forces impossible to achieve. Generally inferior European platforms and combat doctrines prevent all but elite forces from maintaining operational tempo and success on par with that of American units. Poor European logistics (only Britain and France are able to project force well overseas, and their capabilities are limited) meant that during the Yugoslavian and Bosnian operations, American transport units were required to position European units in place. Most of the burden was thus placed on US units that would have probably been better off working with other United States forces. Operations in Afghanistan are similarly instructive. Logistical difficulties and force deficiencies left the provincial reconstruction teams undermanned, undersupplied, and essentially impotent. The United States did almost all of the heavy lifting in that conflict, and NATO forces (mostly operating in safe territory) have contributed comparatively little. Only the most advanced military powers in the world (such as the United Kingdom and Japan) can interoperate well with the United States. Furthermore, the immense financial burden imposed on countries projecting sustained forward forces precludes most of the debt-ridden and deficit spending European countries from dispatching large-scale deployments (since they lack dependable financing from, for example, external central banks).
These fundamental impediments have conspired to rid missions of the benefits theoretically accrued from distributing military operations. The financial and property burdens are not dispersed evenly across those participating in the mission; instead, most of the costs are passed on to the United States. The additional hard power provided is typically inferior and minute. Only a select few countries can actually effectively enhance the combat power of US forces (and of those only Britain is presently a member of the alliance). Thus, Washington gains little if any hard power by going through NATO.
The other core purpose of NATO is to serve as a central forum to coordinate Western foreign and security policy. In that way, the body is an organ aimed at fostering stability through consensus policymaking. NATO thus tries to regulate the foreign policies of its members and ensure that they stay within generally accepted limits. However, with the dissolution of the CCCP, member states are no longer united in their national interests; natural divisions have emerged between the great powers operating under the treaty. France, for instance, often sees its interests running contrary to Washington’s interests. Paris thusly refuses to cooperate on a number of important security-related issues. Stalemate is the result, and NATO lacks the flexible structural features necessary to reconcile fundamentally different worldviews and policy aims. Missions that the White House feels are productive (such as the invasion of Iraq), but that other states vehemently oppose, for example, cannot be run under the auspices of NATO. Similarly, many projects (such as the Proliferation Security Initiative) that are almost universally accepted cannot be run out of NATO, either, since the appropriate bureaucratic machinery does not exist. In essence, the widely divergent policy positions held by Western capitals make policy formulation by consensus impossible.
That said, the United States accrues many ancillary benefits from membership (and leadership) in NATO. Washington, for one thing, does have great say in the policy matters that are brought before the body. This influence can be quite useful. The treaty provides a defensive shield around the eastern edges of Europe as well, protecting these developing European economies from external interference, and giving their governments a measure of stability and legitimacy. The alliance also finances a panoply of low profile joint-projects involving matters from military oceanography to air defense management that provide useful information and services for members to partake in.
Competing Visions
As is, NATO is manifestly a broken institution. Its hard power contributions to military operations are negligible, great power disputes impart deadlock over controversial policies, and most of the benefits Washington currently enjoys arise from ancillary programs. There have been several prominent options floated as of late over how NATO’s dysfunctional state should properly be addressed. These consist of enhancement (broadening NATO’s power and modernizing it to address present day concerns), replacement (removing NATO from the picture, and instead replacing it with either coalitions of the willing or another international institution), and supplementation (keeping NATO as essentially an organ of diplomacy and strict national defense, while replacing its hard power functions with alternative arrangements).
Under the leadership of NATO Secretary General Scheffer, the institution has begun a transformation aimed at combating the threats of the 21st century. Most prominently, the organ’s security apparatus is being retuned for operations against terrorists, with more flexible command structures and the development of specialized response units. The Secretary General also wishes to distribute the costs of military operations more equitably, as the current self-financing system discourages the deployment of military assets through NATO.
However, the fundamental structural problems plaguing the organization will not be resolved by any reform, no matter how ambitious. NATO will continue to function as a transatlantic effort, with the world’s other core powers having little influence over its operations. This will necessarily limit NATO’s usefulness in coordinating large-scale engagements, since the new core powers of the world (such as India) are becoming increasingly essential to international security policy. Furthermore, disparities of interest will persist, as will the capabilities gap. Ad hoc coalition building is a far more effective tool for organizing operations based on intersections of interests.
Others have suggested scrapping the treaty entirely and availing of alternative means to accomplish NATO’s goals. They point to NATO’s inefficiency, structural deficiencies, and dated purpose, and argue that it is no longer a viable institution. Some instead suggest that the United States should revert entirely to ad hoc coalition building and bilateral diplomacy. Some advocate the creation of a new supranational body better able to fulfill NATO’s core goals. Such a body would be vested with significantly more expansive powers than NATO.
This solution suffers from a distinct lack of moderation. Replacing NATO, while perhaps beneficial in some areas, eliminates the numerous assorted benefits that Washington gains from membership. These benefits, as noted before, range from a variety of international cooperative efforts to the projection of a valuable virtual security barrier along the edges of the alliance. For these tasks, the existent NATO infrastructure is effective and useful. Trying to obtain these benefits from other sources would be needlessly expensive, difficult, and inefficient. Thus, completely abolishing NATO (both the good and bad components) would be unwise.
The last option is supplementing NATO with a variety of alternative institutional arrangements. NATO would continue to function as a defense umbrella for its member-states (and would retain the authority to command forces is a member is invaded). It would also continue to fund cooperative joint-efforts of use to the alliance. However, its authority to aggressively apply hard power would be nullified. Instead, these functions would be shifted to ad hoc coalitions and bilateral diplomacy. Its role as a facilitator of global security policy would be eliminated, and then eventually transferred to a body that fairly represents the global power elite.
This arrangement combines the best benefits of each of the aforementioned plans. Those functions that the institution excels at would be maintained, as would the defensive umbrella. The application of military power against global intransigents would be effected through the far superior ad hoc coalition, which would allow great powers to pursue their national interests more efficiently and with greater ease. The drawbacks to such a shift are limited; NATO’s general impotence precludes the accrual of almost any major benefit a nation could receive from it (save for a handful).
As for the facilitation of global security, the establishment of an entirely new body is essential. This new body must be composed of all the world’s core powers, including Japan, China, India, and Brazil. While undoubtedly the interests of each state would diverge markedly over particular issues, the organ would be a very useful device for facilitating global commerce, and establishing the standardized rule sets critical for the 21st century. As it stands, the development of universal standards and economic codes is stunted by the lack of a small (focused) institution representing the interests of the entire global power elite. It would be wise for Washington to see such a body constituted.
(Cross posted at Power Politics)
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